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“When a person cannot deceive himself the chances are against his being able to
deceive other people.”
Mark Twain, Autobiography of Mark Twain.
“Show me someone without an ego, and I’ll show you a loser.”
Donald Trump, How to Get Rich.
1 Introduction
There is ample evidence that the average person thinks he or she is more skillful, more beautiful
and kinder than others. At the same time, such overconfidence may result in substantial personal
and social costs. It leads financial traders to lose money, CEOs to initiate more value-destroying
mergers, and entrepreneurs to invest in projects of lower value.1 In the face of these costs,
rationalizing the persistence of overconfidence requires the existence of offsetting benefits. Social
scientists commonly stress the affective benefits of overconfidence that are associated with a good
self-image, ameliorated anxiety about an uncertain future, or the savoring of future successes.2
However, it is unclear why such desires would survive natural or cultural selection.
An alternative theory posits that the benefits of overconfidence are social in nature. Ac-
cording to Robert Trivers, overconfidence, or self-deception more generally, makes it easier to
convince or deceive others about one’s qualities as it obviates the need for conscious deception
(Trivers, 1985, 2011; Von Hippel and Trivers, 2011). Following George Costanza’s maxim that
“it’s not a lie when you believe it”, deceiving yourself may reduce both the give-away tells and
the moral costs associated with lying.
We conduct a laboratory experiment to test whether overconfidence is used strategically to
more effectively persuade or deceive others. Participants first perform an intelligence test and
receive a small remuneration depending on their relative performance. Afterwards, a randomly
chosen subset of participants is informed of subsequent face-to-face interactions, in which they
can earn money if they manage to convince other participants that they outperformed their
peers on the intelligence test. Before this interaction takes place, we elicit private beliefs about
relative performance, using monetary incentives for accurate reporting.
Our main hypothesis is that participants who are informed of the profitable deception oppor-
tunity will be more confident about their performance than an uninformed control group. We
1See Barber and Odean (2001); Glaser and Weber (2007) and Biais and Hilton (2005) for overconfidence in the
financial domain, Malmendier and Tate (2008) for overconfident CEOs, Koellinger et al. (2007) and Dawson et al.
(2015) for overconfident entrepreneurs. Overconfidence can also lead to excess entry into competition (Camerer
and Lovallo, 1999), inferior bargaining outcomes (Neale and Bazerman, 1985), and faulty forcasts (Arkes, 2001).
The literature section discusses the evidence for overconfidence (and underconfidence) in more detail.
2See e.g. Kunda (1990); Baumeister (1998); Brunnermeier and Parker (2005); Köszegi (2006) for a discussion
of the affective benefits of confidence. Taylor and Brown (1988) and Block and Colvin (1994) and subsequent
papers provide discussions on the impact of positive delusions on health and well-being.
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refer to this difference in subjective confidence as “strategic self-deception”, as it is motivated
by the consequences of holding the belief and not by actual performance or ability. We find
that the shadow of future interactions significantly increases average confidence. In a follow-up
experiment, we investigate the deeper motives behind this strategic self-deception. In support
of a persuasion motive, we find that the treatment effect is stronger among participants who
express a belief that confidence helps persuasiveness in the face-to-face interview. By contrast,
we find no evidence that self-deception is the result of a desire to reduce the moral costs of lying,
of wishful thinking, or of a preference for appearing consistent to the experimenter.
Our second aim is to test whether increased confidence indeed makes participants more
persuasive in their attempts to convince others of their superior performance. Drawing clear
causal inferences about the effects of confidence on communication strategies and social success
is impossible in most datasets, due to reverse causality and unobserved covariates like beauty or
extraversion. Our experimental design avoids the pitfalls of endogeneity by generating exogenous
variation in privately held beliefs with a noisy feedback signal.
We demonstrate that participants’ communication strategies in the face-to-face interactions
reflect an appreciation of the benefits of higher confidence: participants condition their mes-
sage on their privately held beliefs, with higher confidence leading to higher stated confidence.
Moreover, we find that more confident participants are rated as significantly more likely to be
successful by their evaluators in the face-to-face interactions. The significant impact of confi-
dence on evaluations is present even when we control for stated confidence. This indicates that
non-verbal cues are an important driver of a participant’s persuasiveness.
This paper makes two main contributions. First, using fully incentivized elicitations of pri-
vate beliefs, we provide evidence that people become overconfident in the pursuit of a social
advantage. This result may help explain the prevalence of overconfidence. Second, by exoge-
nously varying confidence, we demonstrate that higher confidence causes people to be more
persuasive. This result provides affirmative evidence for folk wisdom and a large popular self-
help literature that present confidence as the road to success, usually by pointing to correlational
evidence that highly successful people are also confident.
2 Literature
We measure “overconfidence” as the overestimation of one’s ability relative to others, or “over-
placement” in the terminology of Larrick et al. (2007). Seminal studies show that a large
majority of people rate themselves above average on positive, and below average on negative
traits (Svenson, 1981; Dunning et al., 1989).3 At the same time, it is well-documented that
people may display overplacement in easy and underplacement in hard tasks (see Larrick et al.
3These findings have been replicated many times, including by experimental economists using belief mea-
surements that incentivize truthful reporting (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Eil and Rao, 2011; Grossman and
Owens, 2012; Möbius et al., 2014).
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(2007) and Moore and Healy (2008) for reviews of these findings). Moore and Healy (2008)
argue that this effect results naturally from uncertainty about one’s own and others’ ability
levels. Similarly, Benôıt and Dubra (2011) show that overplacement will result from a Bayesian
interpretation of feedback, if the latter comes from an easy task.4 These questions about the
prevalence of ‘true’ overconfidence are orthogonal to our experimental treatment, which varies
incentives for self-deception but keeps our IQ test constant.
As far as we know, there exists no direct evidence for the social origins of overconfidence,
although several results are suggestive of our main hypothesis. For instance, psychologists have
demonstrated a connection between self-esteem and strategies of self-presentation (Baumeister
et al., 1989). Von Hippel and Trivers (2011) cite multiple studies showing that confidence plays
a role in the selection of leaders and that people are impressed by confidence in others (see
also Sedikides et al., 2015). Burks et al. (2013) find a correlation between overconfidence about
performance on a cognitive test and a measure of social dominance in a sample of trainee truck
drivers.
Charness et al. (2013) find that experimental participants strategically use public statements
about their own ability to deter others from competing with them. Ewers and Zimmermann
(2015) show that the desire to impress an audience causes experimental subjects to publicly state
higher confidence. Thoma (2015) demonstrates that men strategically deflate their confidence
in order to appear more likable, when others can observe their degree of overconfidence. Since
these three studies do not measure private beliefs,5 they cannot disentangle the role of actual
confidence and stated confidence.
Anderson et al. (2012) study the relation between status and overconfidence. In a series of
experiments, they find that overconfident individuals enjoy higher status in a group. Moreover,
people who are primed with a desire to achieve status rate themselves higher relative to others
on a series of skills and abilities relevant for attaining higher status in a business context. Our
experiment goes beyond this by studying the effects of an actual social interaction rather than
a prime, and by providing monetary incentives for reporting accurate beliefs.
More broadly, our results relate to a large psychological literature on self-deception, mo-
tivated cognition and cognitive dissonance. Kunda (1990) and Baumeister (1998) provide ex-
tensive literature reviews of these phenomena. Classical dissonance experiments like Festinger
and Carlsmith (1959) use a “forced compliance” design that creates dissonance by inducing or
stimulating an aversive cognition or transgressive behavior. Private beliefs and attitudes are
then shown to adapt to be consistent with the induced cognition. Our experiment differs from
the cognitive dissonance literature in two crucial ways. First, we show that beliefs adapt in
4The authors stipulate several testable conditions to reject such rationalizations of overplacement and show
that some, but not all, of the earlier evidence fails these conditions. Subsequent studies refute these conditions,
providing more conclusive evidence for overconfidence in some domains (Burks et al., 2013; Benôıt et al., 2015;
Merkle and Weber, 2011). However, Clark and Friesen (2009) and Moore and Healy (2008) find no evidence of
irrational overplacement, leaving an open debate on the cognitive origins of overconfidence.
5Charness et al. (2013) measure private beliefs, but only in one of their conditions.
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anticipation of potentially devious actions, rather than being a (mechanical) reaction to the
presence of conflicting cognitions. Second, we demonstrate the strategic value of biased beliefs.
Whereas the cognitive dissonance literature considers dissonance reduction to be a goal in itself,
we show that it can help our participants secure monetary gains in subsequent interactions.
Recently, economists have started to investigate motivated cognition and self-deception in
economic contexts (see Bénabou and Tirole (2016) and Gino et al. (2016) for overviews of
this nascent field). This small, mostly theoretical, literature seeks to explain overconfident or
optimistic beliefs as stemming from a (possibly subconscious) optimization process. The models
are often premised on people’s uncertainty of their own preferences and abilities, an idea that
goes back to social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) and self-perception theory (Bem, 1967).
For instance, Bodner and Prelec (2002) and Bénabou and Tirole (2011) show how, in the presence
of uncertainty about their own preferences, people use actions to influence their beliefs about
themselves. Economic models assume a variety of motives that cause people to invest in biased
beliefs,6 but none focus on the strategic motive that plays such a crucial role in our experiment.
Our experiment demonstrates the causal impact of confidence on persuasion. In economics,
several papers report positive correlations between survey measures of self-esteem and job market
outcomes from longitudinal employment data (Drago, 2011; de Araujo and Lagos, 2013). In a
sample of business school students, Kaniel et al. (2010) find that self-reported optimists find
jobs more easily and are promoted more quickly. They also find that optimistic people are rated
by their peers as more charismatic and more likely to succeed. In psychology, there is a large
literature on various strategies of “impression management” in employment interviews, both in
the lab and in the field. Barrick et al. (2009) show that both verbal and non-verbal elements
matter for persuasion, but do not focus on the role of confidence.
A large literature on lie-detection demonstrates that non-professionals are generally not very
good at detecting lies (e.g. Vrij, 2008; Ekman and O’Sullivan, 1991; DePaulo, 1994). Neverthe-
less, there are some physiological clues that reliably indicate lying, such as pupil dilation (Wang
et al., 2010), or fake smiles (Ekman et al., 1988). Belot and Van de Ven (2017) criticize the psy-
chological literature for a lack of incentives for deceit and detection, and the lack of contextual
richness of the interaction. They conduct face-to-face interviews between buyers and sellers and
show that buyers are able to detect fraudulent sellers with a rate that is above chance, although
contextual richness does not seem to matter much in this setting. We use a similar face-to-face
interaction in our experiment, but with a highly structured verbal message.
To our knowledge our paper is the first to use exogenously induced confidence to study per-
suasion. Aronson and Mettee (1968) use fabricated feedback on a personality test to manipulate
6Motives for investing in biased beliefs include “ego-utility” from positive self-beliefs (Köszegi, 2006), “an-
ticipatory utility” from the savoring of future successes (see also Brunnermeier and Parker, 2005; Schwardmann,
2017), political ideoligy Le Yaouanq (2016) and loss aversion Maier (2017). More functional motives for overcon-
fidence include an increased personal motivation to overcome self-control problems (Bénabou and Tirole, 2002),
combatting anxiety and risk-aversion (Eisenbach and Schmalz, 2015), or an increase in task performance (Compte
and Postlewaite, 2004).
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self-esteem and look at the incidence of cheating in a card game. Similarly, Sigall and Gould
(1977) use manipulated feedback to study the effect of self-esteem on efforts in problem solving.
Fischer and Sliwka (2016) use noisy feedback to study the impact of confidence on the motivation
to invest in learning.
3 Experimental Design
Our experiment was programmed in z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The first set of sessions was run
in March 2015 at the Munich Experimental Laboratory for Economic and Social Sciences. We
ran an additional set of six sessions in October 2016. 288 subjects participated in 18 sessions of
exactly 16 subjects each.7 The experiment lasted slightly over 1 hour and the average subject
earned 16.45 euros (min. 4 euros, max. 28.5 euros).8
The experiment had two parts, that we will refer to as the “self-deception stage” and the
“deception stage”. In the self-deception stage, we investigated whether the announcement of
a profitable deception opportunity had an influence on beliefs about their own performance
on an intelligence test. To this end, we separated the group into “contestants”, who were
informed about the later deception opportunity, and a “control” group, who was not. In the
deception stage, we investigated whether (over)confidence made the contestants more persuasive,
as predicted by the theory. Contestants competed to persuade “employers” of their superior
performance on the intelligence test in a face-to-face interaction. Employers were the same
participants who constituted the control group in the self-deception stage of the experiment.
They could earn money by giving accurate evaluations of contestants relative performance in
the test. Contestants could earn money by obtaining high evaluations. The sequencing of
experimental tasks is depicted in Figure 3.
3.1 Self-deception stage
After coming into the lab, participants were introduced to the belief elicitation mechanism
they would face later. The mechanism consisted of a variation of the Becker-DeGroot-Marshak
procedure, known as “matching probabilities” or “reservation probabilities”: participants indi-
cate which probability p makes them indifferent between winning a monetary prize with known
probability p, and winning the same prize when an uncertain event E occurs. After participants
indicate the point of indifference in a list of probabilities, one probability is randomly drawn
from the list and participants are awarded their preferred lottery for that probability. Under
this mechanism, reporting the true subjective probability of E maximizes the chance of winning
7We piloted our design with 32 subjects in December 2014. With 16 subjects in either condition, we found some
preliminary, not statistically significant evidence for our main treatment effect (Hypothesis 1), with a difference
in privately reported prior beliefs of 11 ppt: average beliefs were 54 in the control, 65 in the treatment (p = 0.37
MWU test).
8See full instructions online: https://www.dropbox.com/s/ftd6319tm56x6z0/Instructions.pdf?dl=0.
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Employers only All subjects Contestants only
• Training in belief elicitation
Self- • Raven intelligence test
Deception • Information about interview
Stage • Elicitation of prior belief
• Noisy performance signal
• Elicitation of posterior belief
• Instructions for interaction
Deception • Lie detection tutorial
Stage (LD treatment only)
• Face-to-face interaction
• Elicitation of evaluations • Lying aversion elicitation
• Profit announcements
• Questionnaire
Table 1: Timeline of tasks and information by role.
the prize. So unlike in other elicitation mechanisms, the incentives for truthful reporting do
not depend on risk preferences.9 We explained the procedure as well as the fact that truthful
reporting maximizes the chance of winning the prize. This stage took about 15 minutes, and
we proceeded only once all subjects correctly answered four control questions about the belief
elicitation.
Participants were then divided into anonymous groups of four and proceeded to the intelli-
gence test. The test consisted of 15 Raven matrices of varying difficulty, and participants had 10
minutes to solve as many as they could. Participants obtained 2 points for each correct answer
and lost 1 point for each incorrect or omitted answer. The subjects with the two top scores in
their anonymous group of four earned 2 euros. Their earnings, and hence their ranking within
the group, were only communicated to them at the end of the experiment.
We administered our main treatment after the intelligence test. Of the four groups of four
in each session, two groups were given the role of “contestants” and two groups were designated
as controls. While the control group was not told anything about the deception stage at this
point, we informed contestants of the following key points (see Appendix A for the exact text):
9The veracity of this claim has been established by different authors, and the mechanism has been reinvented
several times, see Schlag et al. (2015) for an overview.
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• In the next part of the experiment you will take the role of contestant.
• You will conduct face-to-face interviews with 4 subjects in the role of employers, who, after inter-
viewing every member of your group, are paid for correctly identifying whether your test score was
amongst the best 2 of your group.
• You are paid for one of your interviews that is selected at random
• If the employer in this interview ranks you as being amongst the top 2 of your group,
you will receive an additional 15 euros.
• Employers are paid for evaluating contestants as accurately as possible.
Next, participants in both treatment and control group were asked to submit their beliefs
using the incentive compatible mechanism explained above. The event about which beliefs
were elicited was “the probability that you are amongst the top 2 performers in your group of
four”. In the remainder of the paper, we will refer to this event as “top 2”. The prize in the
elicitation stage was 3 euros. The instructions made it very salient that elicited beliefs were
strictly confidential and would never be shown to another subject.
After participants submitted their beliefs, we gave them noisy feedback on their performance.
Participants were told that they would be shown a ball drawn from one of two virtual urns
containing 20 balls of different colors. If their performance was actually in the top 2, the ball
would come from an urn with 15 black balls and 5 red balls. If their performance was not
in the top 2, the ball would come from an urn with 15 red balls and 5 black balls. Thus, a
black ball constituted “good news” about their performance, where the likelihood ratio was
0.75/0.25 = 3. We will use the fact that the feedback had a random component to assess the
impact of variation in confidence in the second stage. After subjects had observed the ball, they
reported their belief about being in top 2 for a second time, which concluded the self-deception
stage of the experiment.
3.2 Deception stage
For the face-to-face interactions, the 16 subjects in a session were divided into two groups, each
consisting of 4 contestants and 4 “employers”. The latter formed the control group in the first
stage of the experiment. Before the interviews began, employers were given a paper evaluation
sheet for each contestant on which to write down the contestant’s message and their evaluations
of the contestant’s relative performance, honesty, confidence, likability and attractiveness. The
interviews followed a speed dating protocol. Employers left their computer stations and sat
down in front of the contestants. There were four rounds of interviews so that every employer
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would get to interview each of the four contestants in the same group. Every interview took
place behind a partition to assure a minimal level of privacy.
On the ring of a bell, contestants said one sentence: “I believe that my performance was
in the top 2 of my group with ... percent probability”. In the blank, each contestant verbally
filled in a number between 0 and 100. In the remainder, we will refer to this number as a
contestant’s “message”. During the interviews, none of the 144 contestants said anything more
than this sentence. After the sentence was said there were a few seconds in which employers
could scrutinize contestants faces and body language, before the bell rang again to mark the
end of a round. Employers were given time to fill in their evaluation sheets, before moving on
to the next contestant. As we explain below, we kept the interaction minimalistic in order to
allow for the use of the feedback signal as a valid instrument for a contestant’s confidence.
After the four rounds of interviews, employers returned to their computer stations and en-
tered their evaluations as well as contestants’ messages into the computer. Each employer had to
state the probability she attached to each of the contestant’s being in the top 2. The computer
program enforced that the four elicited probabilities added up to 200, so employers had to revise
their original evaluations if necessary. One of these evaluations was selected at random and the
employer was paid for it according to the familiar Becker-DeGroot-Marshak mechanism, with a
chance to win 10 euros in case of a favorable outcome. The contestant was paid 15 euros if she
was in the top 2, and 0 euros otherwise.
In the meantime, contestants participated in a task that elicited their degree of lying aversion,
based on Gibson et al. (2013). During this task, participants are asked to imagine themselves
in the position of a company CEO, who can earn money by deceiving shareholders about the
company’s value. Again using a Becker-DeGroot-Marshak mechanism, participants are asked to
indicate repeatedly whether they would report deceptively or not, were the amount of money
they could earn from doing so was increased in four steps from 0 cents to 120 cents. After seeing
their payoffs in the experiment, all subjects filled out a questionnaire about their background
characteristics as well as the “assertiveness” scale from the Big 5 personality questionnaire.
Trivers (2011) hypothesizes that the strategic value of confidence consists of eliminating non-
verbal give-away cues associated with lying. This value thus depends on employers’ ability to
spot such cues. The literature on lie detection generally finds that people in the laboratory are
not great at spotting lies in others, although they do somewhat better than chance (Von Hippel
and Trivers, 2011; Belot and Van de Ven, 2017). However, these studies may understate lie
detection abilities outside of the lab, where we seek to deceive spouses, professional recruiters
and loan officers. Recruiters and loan officers are often explicitly trained to pick up on private
information and a spouse often has substantial experience in doing so. These groups can also
draw on a richer interaction environment to help them spot deception.
During the deception stage, we therefore implemented a further treatment in one third of the
sessions. This lie detection (LD) treatment was designed to improve employers’ ability to spot
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lies and to thereby erode some of the artificial advantage bestowed upon the deceiver by the
laboratory context. In the treatment, employers participated in a lie-detection tutorial before
they embarked on the interview. The tutorial featured on-screen written instructions and lasted
3 minutes. Contestants in the sessions of the LD treatment did not know about the tutorial.10
If we do not find a strategic value of confidence in interactions in our baseline, but we do find it
with trained employers, then we should still expect to see the effect in richer field settings.
4 Hypotheses
Our main hypothesis is based on Von Hippel and Trivers (2011). It postulates that contestants
engage in self-deception to become more (over)confident than the control group, because this
helps them convince employers of their relative success. There are two possible deeper motives
for such self-deception. First, higher confidence may eliminate the non-verbal cues associated
with lying (Von Hippel and Trivers, 2011). We will refer to this as the “persuasion motive”.
Second, higher confidence may lead to a reduction in the moral costs of lying (McKay et al.,
2011). We will refer to this as the “moral motive”. Both motives lead to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 Alerting the contestants to the possibility of deception will increase their confi-
dence relative to the control group.
Note that this hypothesis constitutes a stronger test than the theory in Von Hippel and
Trivers (2011) requires. They maintain that natural selection has produced the capacity to
self-deceive because of its social advantages. This does not necessarily imply that this capacity
will always, or only, be used when deception possibilities are present.
Self-deception is only strategic if contestants employ it in the pursuit of a social advantage. A
good indication of whether confidence if perceived as an asset is whether contestants condition
their communication strategies on their confidence. In particular, we expect higher private
beliefs to result in higher stated confidence.
Hypothesis 2 An exogenous increase in confidence will increase contestants’ stated likelihood
to the employer of being in the top 2.
One of the core elements of Trivers’ theory is that increased confidence ultimately provides
an advantage to the self-deceiver. In our experiment, this means that additional confidence
10The tutorial used four lie-detection tips from the wiki http://www.wikihow.com/Detect-Lies on how to
recognize “tells” associated with lying, namely fidgeting, face-touching, fast breathing and incongruent facial
expressions. In addition, it explained that avoidance of eye contact is an unreliable indicator of lying. These tips
are based on a large body of psychological research grounded in psychological research on lie detection, which
has shown that the indicators we have diagnostic power for lies, even if the effects are often not very strong (e.g.
Ekman and Friesen, 1969; Zuckerman et al., 1981).
A working paper version of this article also featured a treatment where contestants were warned about the





























Figure 1: Average beliefs in treatment (contestants) and control group.
increases interview performance, which leads to pecuniary benefits or, more generally, utility
from being seen as capable.
Hypothesis 3 An exogenous increase in contestant confidence will increase evaluations by the
employer.
5 Results of the self-deception stage
Our main hypothesis is that providing some subjects with a profitable opportunity to impress or
persuade others will increase their privately elicited beliefs. To test this hypothesis we compare
the beliefs before feedback of the contestants to the prior beliefs of the control group. We find
that average beliefs among contestants (mean 62.0 percent, s.d. 17.74) are 4.2 percentage points
higher than among subjects in the control group (mean 57.8 percent, s.d. 18.4, two sided t-test
p = 0.049). Figure 1 depicts the average beliefs in treatment and control group relative to the
the objective average belief of 50 percent, the true proportion of subjects in the top 2. If we take
overconfidence to be the difference between the average belief and the true objective percentage,
we find a difference of 12 percentage points in the sample of contestants. More than a third of
this can be attributed to strategic self-deception.
Table 2 presents the results of four OLS regression models. The first column shows the raw
treatment effect on prior beliefs in percent. We control for individual test scores by adding the
score in the second column, and a dummy for every possible test score in the third column. The
positive coefficient of test scores in the second regression model tells us that beliefs correlate
with actual performance and thus appear at least loosely tethered to reality.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Prior belief Prior belief Prior belief Belief bias
Contestant (d) 4.201** 3.770** 4.098** 5.648**
(2.129) (1.871) (1.874) (2.393)
Score 1.149*** -3.289***
(0.124) (0.159)
Dummy for each score No No Yes No
Constant 57.81*** 42.32*** 60.24*** 52.04***
(1.505) (2.135) (2.538) (2.731)
Observations 288 288 288 288
R2 0.013 0.241 0.280 0.602
Table 2: OLS regressions of the determinants of private prior belief (column 1-3), and our measure of overcon-
fidence (column 4); robust standard errors in parentheses; ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
The dependent variable in regression model 4 is a constructed measure of individual over-
and underconfidence. The variable belief bias is constructed by subtracting from a subject’s
prior belief the average likelihood that a subject with the same test score is in the top 2 of his
or her group of four. The treatment effect on belief bias is also positive and significant.11 All
results in Table 2 are robust to the inclusion of the control variables gender or age.
After eliciting beliefs for the first time we provide subjects with an unbiased noisy signal.
Posterior beliefs go down in both groups, but the differences between contestants’ post-feedback
confidence (58.3 percent, s.d. 24.5) and the control group’s (54.7 percent, s.d. 24.1) remains
rather stable. Due to the binary nature of the feedback signal, the distribution of posterior beliefs
becomes more dispersed and, as a result, the difference in means of our confidence measure is
no longer significant (p = 0.21, two sided t-test). In Appendix B we investigate the updating
behavior of subjects and find no meaningful differences between treatment and control group.
Summary 1 Participants that are informed about the profitable opportunity to convince another
participant of their superior performance are about 4 percentage points more confident. This
strategic self-deception explains about one third of the average overconfidence in this group.
In Section 7.1 we present the results of a replication experiment with 400 subjects, where we
find a slightly larger treatment difference of 5 percentage points.
6 Results of the deception stage
In this section, we will use the privately elicited, posterior beliefs of the contestants of the self-
deception stage as a measure of confidence. We investigate how it influences their communication
11The coefficient of test score in regression 4 is negative. To see why, note that for very high scores, a subject
is always in the top 2 and therefore mechanically exhibits a weakly negative belief bias. The reverse is true for
very low test scores.
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strategies and evaluations by employers, who were the same participants that formed the control
group in the self-deception stage.
6.1 Identification strategy
We cannot rely on mere correlations to establish a causal relationship between contestant con-
fidence and the messages stated by the contestant or the evaluation of the contestant by an
employer. Such correlations may be spurious, as contestants’ confidence is likely to correlate
with unobserved determinants of contestants’ messages and employers’ evaluations. For example,
more attractive people may be more confident, experience positive discrimination in evaluations
(Möbius and Rosenblat, 2006) and therefore have less need to lie. Alternatively, an arrogant
personality may drive both overconfidence and lower evaluations in face-to-face interactions.
To avoid the pitfalls of endogeneity, we make use of the exogenous variation in contestants’
confidence that results from the noise component of the feedback signal. Recall that the feedback
signal aligns with the true state of the world, i.e. whether a contestant really was in the top 2, in
75 percent of cases. Since the signal is informative, it shifts contestants’ beliefs. But, conditional
on the true state of the world, the feedback signal a contestant receives is completely random
and exogenous. Since we observe and can perfectly control for whether a subject was in the top
2, we can use the feedback signal as an instrument for contestants’ posterior beliefs.
Figure 2 shows, for each state of the world, the histograms of posterior beliefs separated
by whether a subject received good or bad news. Subjects are very reactive to the signal,
making it a strong instrument. This is confirmed in Appendix C, which contains the first stage
regressions of the instrumental regressions in this section. By keeping the interview interactions
minimalistic, we also assured that subjects were not able to communicate their feedback signal
during the interviews. The signal therefore can only influence outcomes through its impact on
private beliefs. This guarantees the validity of our instrument.
6.2 Do more confident contestants send higher messages?
A good indication of contestants’ appreciation of the strategic value of confidence is that verbally
stated confidence increases with (exogenous shocks to) their private confidence.
Figure 3 shows that most subjects lie: the average message they publicly state in the inter-
views exceeds their privately held beliefs. The fitted line indicates that the correlation between
confidence and average message is positive. Furthermore, we observe that the distance between
average message and the truth decreases with increasing confidence, while the likelihood of ob-
serving subjects telling the truth (an observation on the 45 degree line) increases with confidence.
Part of this pattern may reflect a “ceiling effect”, as privately confident subjects have less room
to exaggerate their confidence in public. In total, 38% of subjects provide a consistent message
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Figure 2: Histograms of posterior beliefs for those not in the top 2 (left panel) and those in the
top 2 (right panel).
The first regression model in Table 3 confirms the positive correlation between confidence
and message. The OLS regression in the second column shows that a good-news signal increases
messages. Since we control for whether the contestant truly was in the top 2 of her group of 4,
the coefficient of black ball demonstrates the causal effect of confidence on messages.
Our favored specification is the instrumental variable regression in column 3, where confi-
dence is instrumented by black ball. It shows that a 1 percentage point increase in the posterior
belief, our measure of confidence, increases the message by 0.26 percentage points. Since the
coefficient is smaller than 1 (and since the bulk of contestants state messages that lie above their
privately held beliefs), an increase in confidence is also associated with a decrease in the size of
the lie. Results in Appendix D indicate that lying also decreases along the extensive margin as
confidence increases.
The coefficient in the IV regression (column 3) has the same size as the OLS estimate (column
1). Testing for endogeneity based on the specification in column 3, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that posterior beliefs can be treated as an exogenous variable (p=0.96).12
In column 4, we show that the effect size of the IV regression is robust to controlling for lying
aversion, gender and test scores. As expected, more lying averse subjects send lower messages.
All regressions in Table 3 indicate that the average contestant increases her message from earlier
to later interview rounds. This may be due to contestants getting more practiced at lying.
Summary 2 A one percentage point increase in confidence increases the message by 0.26 per-
centage points.
12We use a variant of a standard Hausman test that allows for clustered standard errors (e.g. see Cameron
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Figure 3: Scatter plot of average messages and confidence, as measured by privately elicited
posterior beliefs.
6.3 Does higher confidence cause better evaluations?
There are two ways in which higher confidence could lead to higher employer evaluations. First,
as we have seen, higher confidence leads contestants to state higher messages. If employers do
not discount the truth-content of messages by too much, for instance because they expect some
subjects to be honest, higher messages may lead to higher evaluations. Second, more confident
individuals may be able to more convincingly deliver a message of a given size by avoiding
suspicious non-verbal cues. These channels reflect the two advantages of higher confidence that
respectively give rise to the moral motive and the persuasion motive of self-deception.
The first four regression models in Table 4 focus on our baseline treatment. The OLS
regression in column 1 shows that more confident contestants, i.e. those with a higher posterior
belief, receive higher evaluations from employers. Column 2 tells us that contestants who receive
a good signal obtain higher evaluations, controlling for whether the contestant actually was in the
top 2. This demonstrates that contestant confidence has a positive causal effect on evaluations
by employers.
In the IV regression in column 3, the posterior belief is instrumented by the signal, again
controlling for top 2. We see that a one percentage point increase in the posterior belief leads
to a 0.32 percentage point increase in the evaluation a contestant receives. The fact that the
coefficient in the IV regression exceeds the coefficient in the OLS regression is indicative of the
OLS regression being biased by endogeneity.13 We cannot be sure about the exact reason for
13We use a variant of a standard Hausman test that allows for clustered standard errors (e.g. see Cameron and
Miller (2015), section 7.B) to test for endogeneity. Whether we can reject the null hypothesis that posterior beliefs
are exogenous depends on the specification. It can not be rejected in the specification of column 3 (p=0.29). But
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OLS regressions IV regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Message Message Message Message
Posterior 0.261*** 0.260*** 0.299***
(0.0483) (0.0972) (0.0963)
Round 0.416** 0.416** 0.416** 0.416**
(0.200) (0.200) (0.197) (0.197)
Black ball (d) 5.381**
(2.487)








Constant 57.35*** 68.38*** 57.12*** 53.69***
(3.645) (2.290) (5.189) (5.140)
Observations 576 576 576 576
R2 0.158 0.061 0.158 0.226
Table 3: Determinants of contestant’s messages; in the IV regressions the posterior belief is instrumented by
black ball ; standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the subject’s group of 4 contestants and 4 employers;
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
the endogeneity; one possible cause is an omitted personality trait, such as arrogance, that is
positively correlated with confidence and negatively correlated with evaluations.
To investigate how much of the effect of beliefs on evaluations works through the messages
contestants sent to employers, column 4 adds messages to the set of regressors.14 When doing so,
the coefficient of posterior beliefs decreases slightly but remains significant. Messages themselves
also have a strong effect on evaluations. Column 4 therefore suggests that higher confidence leads
to higher evaluations through both verbal and non-verbal channels. Quantitatively, these two
channels appear to be of roughly equal importance.
The lie detection treatment. In column 5 we study the determinants of employers’ eval-
uations in the lie detection (LD) condition. We hypothesize that, controlling for messages,
employers in the LD condition might be more responsive to privately held beliefs than employ-
ers in the baseline condition. The data show that the opposite appears to be true, as employers
it can be rejected in the specification in column 4 (p=0.079).
14We saw in section 6.2 that there appears to be no omitted variable that jointly determines confidence and
messages. Nonetheless, there may exist omitted variables that correlate with a contestant’s message and the
evaluation she obtains, independent of confidence. Since we cannot completely rule out this particular source
of endogeneity, the specifications that feature the contestant’s message as an explanatory variable should be
interpreted with caution.
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OLS regressions IV regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: Evaluation Evaluation Evaluation Evaluation Evaluation
Posterior 0.221*** 0.320** 0.290** -0.252
(0.0635) (0.127) (0.132) (0.179)
Round -0.792 -0.792 -0.792 -0.917 -2.676*
(1.275) (1.277) (1.245) (1.249) (1.579)
Black ball (d) 5.650**
(2.308)
Top 2 (d) 3.907 -1.295 -1.864 13.78***
(4.090) (4.815) (4.629) (4.541)
Message 0.284*** 0.518***
(0.0923) (0.150)
Constant 39.02*** 47.38*** 33.85*** 15.13*** 26.93***
(4.978) (4.022) (6.533) (5.058) (6.495)
Condition Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline LD
Observations 384 384 384 384 192
R2 0.070 0.043 0.057 0.112 0.243
Table 4: Determinants of employers’ evaluations of contestant; in the IV regressions the posterior belief is
instrumented by black ball ; standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the subjects’ group of 4 contestants
and 4 employers, ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
in the LD treatment appear not to be responsive to contestants’ confidence. Instead, the signif-
icant coefficient of top 2 indicates that they are able to identify true ability. This is somewhat
surprising, because spotting true ability is different from spotting lies, which we define as in-
creases of stated confidence over truly held confidence. Unfortunately, we cannot put too much
weight on these interpretations. It turns out that our random variation in feedback produced
a skewed distribution of signals and the results are sensitive to outlier observations.15 Thus,
the LD treatment does not provide any definite evidence on the importance of confidence when
facing a trained audience, which remains an interesting and open question.
Summary 3 An increase in confidence by 1 percentage point increases evaluations by about
0.22 percentage points. We find suggestive evidence that both higher interview messages and a
more convincing non-verbal performance by contestants are the drivers of this effect.
In Appendix E, we establish that the results in Table 4 are robust to more flexible model
specifications for messages and the inclusion of control variables related to characteristics of the
15 The effect of the exogenous shift in beliefs (black ball) and true ability (top 2 ) on evaluations is identified by
looking at those contestants for whom these two independent variables do not take the same value. Unfortunately,
only 2 out of 48 contestants in the LD condition were not in the top 2 and received a good signal. These
subjects also turned out to be much more optimistic (an average posterior of 80 percent) compared to the
baseline treatment. Furthermore, only 5 out of 48 contestants were in the top 2 and received a bad signal. These
subjects were much more pessimistic (an average posterior of 40 percent) compared to the baseline. This makes
it impossible to adequately disentangle the relative importance of beliefs and ability in shaping evaluations.
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contestant, the employer, and other contestants in the same group.
7 Discussion
In this section we present the results of a follow-up experiment. We provide a replication of
our self-deception result, and disentangle the potential motives behind it. We also discuss the
terminology of self-deception.
7.1 Replication
To replicate our self-deception result and delve deeper into the motivation behind it, we ran a
separate experiment. We conducted the sessions in October 2016 in the Munich Experimental
Laboratory for Economic and Social Sciences, where 400 subjects (200 contestants and 200
employers) participated. The self-deception stage was the same as in the first experiment, but
we made a slight change to the composition of the control group. In each experimentally matched
group of 4 contestants, two contestants were informed about (their role in) the interviews before
the belief elicitation, and two were informed afterwards (but before the interview). Contestants
were not aware that some of their group members were in a different condition. Thus, while 100
treated contestants had knowledge about the interview at the time of the elicitation, the control
group consisting of 100 untreated contestants and 200 employers did not.16
We replicate our main result on self-deception. On average, the informed group is more
confident (mean 60.8, s.d. 18.2) than the control group (mean 54.4, s.d. 20.5, two-sided t-test
p = 0.0063). Table 5 presents OLS regressions, where column 1 is analogous to column 2 of
Table 2. Controlling for score, contestants who were aware of the interview are almost 5ppt
more confident than the control group.
7.2 Motives for self-deception
Persuasion motive. Trivers’ theory is based on the idea that self-deception occurs because
of an (implicit) belief that confidence helps to convince others. To test whether this persuasion
motive is at play in driving the strategic self-deception we observe, our follow-up experiment
included a task to elicit the belief that confidence aids persuasion in the deception stage. This
task took place after the interviews, but before payoffs were announced. We incentivized people
to state beliefs about the probability that each of three anonymous contestants from the first
16We made these changes to test whether self-deceiving contestants outperform non-self-deceiving contestants.
We hypothesized that belief elicitation would function as an anchor for the beliefs of the control-contestants, so that
treated contestants would go into the interview with higher confidence, and outperform the control-contestants.
However, in a post-interview measure of confidence we found that the difference in confidence between the two
groups had almost entirely dissipated during the interview. This suggested that the belief the control group
increased their confidence upon learning about the interview and belief elicitation did not function as anchor. In
line with this, we found no evidence that the treated group did better in the interview, although we did see a
statistically highly significant correlation between confidence and evaluations.
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Baseline Persuasion Lying av. Wishful Consistent Dominant
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Belief Belief Belief Belief Belief Belief
Score 0.884*** 0.863*** 1.008*** 0.881*** 0.880*** 0.930***
(0.131) (0.132) (0.135) (0.133) (0.206) (0.0883)
Treatment 4.839** 0.549 5.018 3.880 5.620* 12.54**
(2.049) (3.032) (4.370) (2.476) (2.964) (5.098)
Confidence Pays (CP) 0.0543
(0.0512)
Treatment × CP 0.159*
(0.0857)
Lying Aversion (LA) -1.866
(8.684)
Treatment × LA -0.287
(9.678)
Ability Pays (AP) -0.0453
(0.0531)








Treatment × D -14.68*
(8.422)
Constant 47.98*** 46.83*** 45.37*** 48.61*** 44.55*** 36.69***
(1.574) (1.871) (4.172) (1.824) (2.861) (3.280)
Observations 400 400 344 400 200 672
R2 0.129 0.146 0.178 0.131 0.159 0.186
Table 5: Determinants of privately stated confidence; OLS regressions; robust standard errors in parentheses;
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
experiment, denoted X, Y , Z, were selected in the decisive interview round. Subjects were told
(truthfully) that contestants X and Y differed from each other only in ability, while contestants
X and Z differed from each other only in privately stated confidence.17 Thus, the differences in
these pairwise beliefs give us an individual measure of the subjective importance of ability and
confidence for interview success.
To test the impact of this belief, column 2 in Table 5 shows OLS regressions that include
Confidence pays, our measure for this belief, as well as an interaction with the treatment.
17Specifically, let a denote privately stated confidence in percentages, b confidence stated in the interview, and
c being in the top 2 (1) or not (0). Subjects saw the following information in a table: (aX , bX , cX) = (75, 75, 1),
(aY , bY , cY ) = (75, 75, 0) and (aZ , bZ , cZ) = (35, 75, 1). The subjects were asked to give their best guess of
the probability that each of the three candidates would get selected. Each guess was rewarded with the BDM
mechanism with a prize of 30 eurocents.
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The belief that confidence enhances interview performance increases the treatment effect at
marginal significance levels. Moreover, the coefficient for the treatment dummy becomes small
and statistically indistinguishable from zero. These results are direct evidence that self-deception
is motivated by a desire to be more persuasive. On the basis of our data, we cannot say whether
subjects are aware of this motivation when we elicited their confidence either during the self-
deception stage or afterwards.
Lying aversion. A further deep motive consistent with strategic self-deception is that even if
lies are never detected, there may be moral costs from deceiving another person (Gneezy, 2005).
A (subconscious) desire to avoid such costs gives a “moral motive” for self-deception (McKay
et al., 2011). Di Tella et al. (2015) provide evidence for such self-deception from a somewhat
different context, showing that people will negatively bias their beliefs about other people in
order to justify taking money from them. We hypothesize that more lying averse individuals, as
measured by the task in Gibson et al. (2013, see Section 3), are more likely to self-deceive.18
Column 3 of Table 5 introduces our measure of lying aversion, as well as an interaction
with the treatment. We elicited lying aversion from contestants in both our original and our
replication experiment, so we combine the data to achieve maximum power. We find that lying
aversion does not decrease the size of the treatment effect, although the treatment dummy now
becomes insignificant.19
7.3 Alternative motives
We now discuss two further motives that could plausibly drive our results in the self-deception
stage, but are not consistent with strategic self-deception.
Wishful thinking. Wishful thinking can be a force behind self-deception (Mayraz, 2011;
Heger and Papageorge, 2013). A wishful thinker derives “anticipatory utility” from the belief
that things will turn out well for her in the future. In the context of our experiment, this may
inspire her to inflate her belief that she is a “top 2 type”, either because she thinks that her
higher belief makes her more persuasive, or because she believes that employers can actually spot
who is in the top 2, regardless of contestants’ beliefs. While the former mechanism is consistent
with the persuasion motive we hypothesize, the latter is a potential confound to the result that
self-deception is strategic.
We investigate whether this latter form of self-deception plays a role in our experiment,
using contestants’ belief that ability helps interview performance. The measurement of this
18Whether this translates into higher degrees of overconfidence depends on whether lying aversion extends also
to lying to oneself. However, since self-deception seems a largely unconscious process, unlike guilt from lying to
others, we conjecture that higher lying costs increase overconfidence.
19The coefficient for lying aversion is also insignificant in the follow-up experiment only. Note that since we
only have the lying aversion measure for contestants, the treatment dummy is estimated using only the control
group of uninformed contestants in the follow-up experiment.
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belief was described above in the discussion of the persuasion motive. Column 3 of Table 5
includes OLS regressions where we include ability Pays, our measure for the belief that ability
enhances interview performance, as well as an interaction term with the treatment dummy. We
find no evidence that anticipatory utility drives self-deception in our experiment. The coefficient
for the interaction is not close to conventional significance levels, and although the treatment
effect declines slightly, we cannot accept the null hypothesis with any confidence.
Appearing consistent. Another potential confound for our results is a motivation to appear
consistent. At the belief elicitation stage, subjects may anticipate that they will lie in the
interview, even though they have not yet received the exact instructions for this stage. Subjects
may wish to avoid appearing like a liar to the experimenter, the only person who observes both
private and public statements, albeit in an anonymized and impersonal manner. This wish may
lead them to exaggerate their private belief statement and incur the costs of decreased accuracy.
To test whether such concerns play a role we implemented a new belief elicitation after the
deception stage. This elicitation was designed to maximize consistency concerns for two reasons.
First, because subjects have just made their verbal interview statements, consistency concerns
should be more salient in this elicitation. Moreover, we did not incentivize this elicitation for
accuracy, making it costless to submit a report that is consistent with the interviews.
We find that 48 out of 200 subjects (24%) report a belief that is the same as the message in
the last interview round. This identifies the subjects who are potentially (most) concerned with
consistency. In Table 5, column 5, we include a dummy for such consistency in the regressions for
confidence, as well as an interaction term between consistency and the treatment. We observe
no significant coefficient for the latter and a slight increase in the treatment effect. Statistical
significance declines a bit in what is now a smaller sample, as consistency is defined only for
contestants and not for employers. We obtain very similar results if we define consistency as
the equality between the initial (incentivized) belief elicitation and the message in the first or
any other interview round. We conclude that consistency concerns do not explain the treatment
effect.
Dominance as a trait. Burks et al. (2013) find that socially “dominant” individuals exhibit
more overconfidence. They conjecture that this is because socially dominant individuals at-
tribute more importance to the belief of others about their ability. If this is indeed the case,
dominant individuals should exhibit a boost in confidence when told about the interview, as
this introduces an audience for their confidence. We thus expect a stronger treatment effect for
dominant individuals in our experiment.
To test this hypothesis, we collected a measure of “Assertiveness”, based on the “Big Five
Aspect Scales” (BFAS, DeYoung et al., 2007).20 DeYoung et al. (2007) validate this scale and
20The BFAS divides each of the Big 5 domains into two different “aspects”, measured on a 10-item scale.
DeYoung et al. (2007) show that these aspects correlate with other questionnaire measures, as well with genetic
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argue that it captures the aspect of extroversion that is related to dominance and personal
agency. Column 6 of Table 5 introduces our measure of dominance and the interaction with
the treatment. We elicited dominance from contestants in both our original and our replication
experiment, so we combine the data to achieve maximum power.21 Dominant individuals have
much higher confidence: going from the bottom rank to the top rank of the scale increases
confidence by 17 ppt. We thus replicate the result in Burks et al. (2013). The negative interaction
term shows that in contrast to our hypothesis, more dominant individuals react much less
strongly to the treatment. When taking this into account, the treatment effect for the least
dominant person rises to 12.5 ppt.
One way to understand these results is that confidence is a character trait of dominant
individuals, who are simply confident in any situation, competitive or not. By contrast, the
confidence of less dominant individuals is more amenable to the strategic situation.
Summary 4 We find that participants who believe that persuasion is important for interview
success exhibit more strategic self-deception than participants who do not hold this belief. A
moral motive, wishful thinking, and preferences for consistency do not explain the treatment
effect. Dominant individuals are more confident and their confidence reacts less to information
about the interview.
7.4 “Self-deception” as a metaphor
In the introduction, we defined “self-deception” as a change in confidence that is motivated by
the consequences of holding the belief, not by actual performance or ability. This definition does
not satisfy the criterion for self-deception posed in Gur and Sackeim (1979) and Pinker (2011),
as we do not show that subjects hold two contradicting beliefs at the same time. Following Von
Hippel and Trivers (2011), we posit that self-deception can occur by simply failing to encode
negative information about the self, without necessarily constructing a realistic image alongside
the distorted one. The terminology of “self-deception” has been criticized by Kurzban (2011),
among others. Kurzban argues that in a modular conception of the brain there is little space for
a “self” that is being deceived. We think these and other conceptual criticisms of self-deception
are effectively countered in Von Hippel and Trivers (2011, see the discussion section).
We do not take the term “self-deception” to imply a literal description of how the brain
works. Rather, we take it to be a useful metaphor for our purposes, as it captures both strategic
and intentional shift in confidence (the “deception”) and the fact that people make these beliefs
their own and are willing to wager money on them (the “self”). While this duality may be
too simple for some purposes, it enlightens the conflict between self-enhancement and realism
factors. “Assertiveness” is one of the aspects of the Extroversion domain. Items are e.g. “I know how to captivate
people”, and “I can talk others into doing things”. We added the scores on all these items, and normalized the
scale to fall between 0 (least dominant) and 1 (most dominant).
21In one session, our software malfunctioned during the questionnaire, resulting in lost data on this measure
from 16 individuals. The aggregate results reported here are qualitatively robust in each individual experiment.
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that is the focus of our experiment. In this sense, it is not different from other multiple-self
metaphors in economic psychology, like the “system 1” and “system 2” distinction that highlights
a fundamental tradeoff between the quality and speed of decision making (Kahneman, 2011),
and planner-doer models that elucidate specific aspects of intertemporal choice (Thaler and
Shefrin, 1981).
8 Conclusion
The results of our experiment demonstrate that the strategic environment matters for cognition
about the self. We find that information about deception opportunities increases confidence,
and that this effect is driven by a (possibly subconscious) belief on behalf of our subjects that
higher confidence makes one more persuasive. We also find that increased confidence pays off:
controlling for ability, more confident participants are more convincing in face-to-face interac-
tions. Participants in our experiment successfully employ overconfidence for social gain, which
may help explain the prevalence of overconfidence in the field.
Although our experiment takes place in the lab and features a highly stylized interaction,
there are reasons to believe that our results will generalize to other settings. Weiss and Feldman
(2006) present evidence from a field experiment that people routinely tell falsehoods in job
interviews to enhance the impression they make on the employer. Barrick et al. (2009) conduct
a meta-study on “impression management” in job interviews, including both laboratory (“mock
interviews”) and field studies (“real hiring decisions”). The results show that the impact of
impression management on interview ratings is similar in the lab and in the field.
We find support for the idea that cognition did not evolve only to generate accurate rep-
resentations of the world (McKay and Dennett, 2009). Instead, faulty representations can be
optimal reactions to an individual’s environment. In the physical world, our senses evolved
to construct a version of reality that aids our survival. A similar argument can be applied to
the social world, where our cognition has evolved to generate representations that improve our
payoffs. Self-confidence appears to be a form of cognition where inaccurate representations can
sometimes provide higher benefits than accurate ones.
Our results have several implications for the link between economic incentives and psychol-
ogy. For instance, they suggest when and where we should expect overconfidence to occur. It
may arise in employer-employee relationships because of its strategic benefits in job interviews
and wage negotiations. Arguably, confidence may be even more valuable amongst the self-
employed, whose economic survival often depends more immediately on persuading investors
and customers.22 Generally, overconfidence is likely to be more pronounced in settings where its
22While several studies provide evidence for the selection of overconfident individuals into entrepreneurship
(see e.g. Dawson et al., 2014, for an overview), our results suggest a reverse causality by which self-employment
may encourage overconfidence. Consistent with this argument, Dawson et al. (2014) find that, in addition to the
selection effect of overconfidence, becoming self-employed is followed by a boost in confidence.
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strategic value is highest, i.e. where measures of true ability are noisy, job competition is high
and persuasion is an important part of success. Accordingly, we would expect overconfidence to
be rife amongst high level professionals in business, finance, politics and law.
The results also suggest that asymmetric information changes with the economic environ-
ment. If people deceive themselves to better deceive others, mechanisms devised by a principal
trying to detect an agent’s private information may themselves trigger cognitive investments
in biased beliefs, perhaps sparking an “arms race” between detection and deception efforts.
Endogenizing asymmetric information in this way would be an interesting theoretical exercise,
complementing current models of screening potentially honest agents (Alger and Renault, 2006),
and agents who engage in wishful thinking (Bridet and Schwardmann, 2017).
A crucial challenge for researchers on overconfidence is to figure out whether policy makers
should attempt to debias overconfident individuals. If overconfidence mainly serves to reduce
anxiety or to provide motivation, it may well be socially beneficial. On the other hand, hiring
or funding the confident instead of the able leads to a misallocation of talent and resources.
Therefore, if overconfidence is mainly the result of strategic self-deception and does not possess
psychological benefits, it is more likely to be socially wasteful. The exact welfare implications of
strategic self-deception are likely to be subtle and depend on the environment as well as agents’
private information. Characterizing these welfare implications constitutes an important research
agenda.
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Schlag, Karl H., James Tremewan, and Joël J. Van der Weele, “A Penny for Your Thoughts: A
Survey of Methods for Eliciting Beliefs,” Experimental Economics, 2015, 18 (3), 457–490.
Schwardmann, Peter, “Motivated health risk denial and the market for preventative health care,”
Mimeo, Ludwig Maximilians Universität München, 2017.
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APPENDIX
A On-screen interview announcement (translated from German)
(For a complete set of instructions in German and English, see https: // www. dropbox. com/
s/ ftd6319tm56x6z0/ Instructions. pdf? dl= 0 )
Interview instructions
In the next part of the experiment, the 16 participants will be split into two groups of eight.
There will be four “employers” and four “contestants” in each group. Each participant will
conduct a short “job interview” with all members of their group in the opposite role. Therefore,
each participant will have four interviews.
Based on your experimental ID, you were assigned the role of a contestant.
Employers and contestants will have job inteviews that take the form of a face-to-face inter-
action. Contestants will make a verbal statement about the probability that they scored the
highest or second highest test score (hereafter, the best two contestants will be referred to as
“Top2”).
Based on these statements, employers have to evaluate how likely it is that a contestant is truly in
the top 2. For each employer, the two contestants with the highest evaluation are automatically
hired.
After the hiring decision has been made, one of your four interviews is randomly selected. Your
payment is based on this interview. To assure anonymity, it will not be revealed which interview
determines the payment.
The payment of the employer is determined by how well they can evaluate contestants. Contes-
tants’ payment depends employers’ evaluations.
If you are hired in the randomly selected interview (that is, if you are in the top 2,
according to the employer’s evaluation), you will earn 15 euros in addition to your
other earnings.
As a contestant, you will therefore make more money, if you are better than the other contestants
at convincing the employers of your superior relative performance.
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B Bayesian updating regressions
Möbius et al. (2014) study updating behavior in an ego-relevant task. They find that subjects
update conservatively, by responding too little to new information, and asymmetrically, by giving
higher weight to good feedback than bad feedback. We investigate whether these updating biases
exist in our sample, and whether they differ between subjects in the control and treatment
condition. To control for prior beliefs and the distribution of signals between the two groups, we
follow Möbius et al. (2014) in running logit regressions, which are based on a linearized version
of Bayes’ formula. The model is given by
logit(µi,post) = δlogit(µi,prior) + βHI(si = H)λH + βLI(si = L)λL + ǫi. (1)
Here, µi,prior and µi,post represent the prior and the posterior belief of person i respectively.
λH = −λL is the log of the likelihood ratio, which in our case is 0.75/0.25 = 3. I(si = H) and
I(si = L) are indicator variables for a high and low signal respectively.
As explained in more detail in Möbius et al. (2014), perfect Bayesian updating implies
δ, βH , βL = 1. Several different deviations from perfect Baysian updating can be distinguished.
If both βH < 1 and βL < 1, this implies that subjects are “conservative”, i.e. they place too
little weight on new information. If βH > βL, this implies “asymmetry”, i.e. subjects place more
weight on good signals compared to bad signals. Finally, δ < 1 implies what we call “centrism”,
an updating bias toward a posterior of 50 percent.
Table B.1 shows the results of OLS regressions, where stars indicate rejections of the null
hypothesis that the coefficient is 1 at different levels of confidence. Columns 1 to 3 reflect the
entire sample, whereas columns 4 to 6 exclude subjects with “irregular updates”, i.e. either
zero updates or updates in the wrong direction. At the top of each column we indicate the
sample (control, contestant, all) under consideration. Table B.2 shows the same regressions
with interaction terms for the treatment group, making it possible to directly compare treatment
effects between the two groups.
Our main findings are the following. First, we reject βH = 1 for all specifications, and reject
βL = 1 for the full sample only. Thus, subjects in both groups are conservative on average.
Second, in the restricted sample, βH < βL with p = 0.067, so if anything, subjects respond
more to bad signals than good signals. This contrasts with Möbius et al. (2014) who find the
opposite, although there are several non-replications of this result by Coutts (2016) and Buser
et al. (2016). Finally, we find no significant differences between the treatment (contestants)
and control group. Although the treatment group seems to be somewhat less responsive to
information in general, this tendency is not statistically significant.
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Full sample Restricted sample
All Employers Contestants All Employers Contestants
δ 0.740*** 0.784*** 0.698*** 0.803*** 0.843** 0.750**
(0.0584) (0.0560) (0.0985) (0.0648) (0.0605) (0.114)
βH 0.601*** 0.621*** 0.592*** 0.781*** 0.727*** 0.857*
(0.0535) (0.0576) (0.0936) (0.0425) (0.0484) (0.0788)
βL 0.604*** 0.648*** 0.551*** 0.897* 0.903 0.874
(0.0566) (0.0785) (0.0833) (0.0572) (0.0808) (0.0840)
Observations 280 139 141 208 108 100
R2 0.663 0.713 0.621 0.798 0.803 0.797
Table B.1: Belief updating regressions. Columns 1 to 3 reflect the entire sample, whereas columns 4 to 6
exclude subjects with “irregular updates”, i.e. either zero updates or updates in the wrong direction. At the top
of each column we indicate the sample (control, contestant, all) under consideration. H0: coefficient equals 1.









δ * contestant -0.0857 -0.0933
(0.113) (0.129)
βH * contestant -0.0288 0.130
(0.110) (0.0924)




Table B.2: Belief updating regressions. Column 1 includes the entire sample, whereas column 2 exclude subjects
with “irregular updates”, i.e. either zero updates or updates in the wrong direction. H0: coefficient equals 1.
Standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
C First stage regressions
Table C.1 shows the first stage regressions of the second stages we report in sections 6.2 and
6.3. Recall that we use our feedback signal as an instrument. The dummy variable black ball
takes a value of 1 if the subject received good news. Since we can perfectly control for the state
of the world, i.e. whether a subject was in the top 2, the conditional effect of the variable black
ball is exogenous.
Other things equal, seeing a good signal boosts privately held beliefs by between 17 to 31
percentage points. This effect is highly significant in all first stage regressions. High F-Statistics
provide further evidence for the strength of our instrument. Merely in column 5 do we see a
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Corresp. 2nd stage: Table 3, C(3) Table 3, C(4) Table 4, C(3) Table 4, C(4) Table 4, C(5)
Dependent var.: Posterior Posterior Posterior Posterior Posterior
Black ball (d) 20.68*** 20.72*** 17.63*** 16.73*** 31.07***
(4.279) (3.647) (4.540) (4.053) (9.275)
Top 2 11.01** 0.931 16.24*** 14.45*** -5.759











Constant 43.28*** 32.26*** 42.21*** 8.433 33.42**
(2.675) (3.624) (3.311) (6.884) (12.71)
Observations 576 576 384 384 192
R2 0.346 0.408 0.368 0.468 0.393
F-Statistic 45.00 30.72 34.38 52.27 6.647
Table C.1: First stage regressions; ordinary least squares; standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the
subject’s group of 4 contestants and 4 employers; ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
F-Statistic lower than 10. This column provides the first stage regression for the specification of
column 5 in table 4, which was run exclusively over data from the lie detection treatment. The
F-Statistic shows that our instrument in this subsample might be rather weak. This adds to
the arguments in footnote 15 and casts doubt over the merit of interpreting second stage results
from the LD treatment
D The incidence of lying
We define a lie as a message that is higher than the contestant’s posterior belief. We therefore do
not count untruthful understatements of one’s beliefs as lies, although all results presented here
are robust to defining a lie as any message that deviates from the posterior belief. The probit
regressions in Table D.1 mirror the regressions in Table 3 except that the dependent variable is
now the incident of a lie. Column 1 indicates that a higher posterior is associated with a lower
likelihood of lying. Using the exogenous variation provided by the feedback signal, columns 2
and 3 suggest that the negative effect of confidence on the decision to lie is causal. Column 4
tells us that this causal effect is robust to the inclusion of controls. More lying averse subjects lie
less, although this coefficient is not significant. Interestingly, women lie more in our experiment.
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Probit regressions IV probit regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Lie Lie Lie Lie
Posterior -0.0368*** -0.0403*** -0.0401***
(0.00618) (0.0119) (0.0116)
Round 0.0249 0.0198 0.0241 0.0236
(0.0292) (0.0230) (0.0295) (0.0295)
Black ball -0.697***
(0.240)






Constant 2.641*** 0.966*** 2.891*** 2.974***
(0.480) (0.193) (0.662) (0.711)
Observations 576 576 576 576
Table D.1: Determinants of a contestant’s decision to lie; in the IV probit regressions posterior is instrumented
by black ball ; standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the subject’s group of 4 contestants and 4 employers;
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
E Robustness of results on employer evaluations
In column 1 of Table E.1 we add the variables score, female, age and dominant to the specification
in column 3 of Table 4 and confirm that our results are robust to the inclusion of these of controls.
We see that female contestants obtain lower evaluations from employers than male contestants
We think that our experiment provides a promising interaction environment in which to study
gender discrimination. However, an in-depth discussion of gender effects in the current dataset
lies beyond the score of this paper.
In column 2 we test the robustness of specification 4 in Table 4 to the inclusion of further
controls. The effect of messages on evaluations is robust. In column 3 we run regressions that
allow for a non-linear impact of messages by including separate dummy variables for messages in
each decile (0-10 percent, 11-20 percent etc.). This does not influence the size or significance of
the posterior’s coefficient. For lack of space, Table E.1 does not include the individual dummy
variables. However, we note that there seems to be no punishment by the employers for extreme
messages higher than 90% (boasts). That is, evaluations are monotonically increasing in the
message a contestant states.
In columns 4 and 5 we test whether our results in Table 4 are robust to the inclusion of
variables pertaining to a contestant’s three competitors. We report reduced form OLS regressions
with the instrument (i.e. the black ball dummy) as an independent variable. We then add the
number of black balls a contestant’s competitors saw as a valid measure of the competitors’
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IV regressions OLS regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: Evaluation Evaluation Evaluation Evaluation Evaluation
Posterior 0.346*** 0.271** 0.245**
(0.122) (0.116) (0.118)
Top 2 0.541 3.485 4.309 -0.989 3.016
(4.870) (4.293) (3.854) (5.619) (4.434)
Round -0.792 -0.949 -0.915 -0.792 -1.066
(1.245) (1.249) (1.251) (1.282) (1.298)
Female (d) -7.336*** -6.336*** -7.415***
(2.240) (2.025) (1.873)
Score -0.247 -0.583** -0.526** 0.335 -0.102
(0.240) (0.246) (0.223) (0.294) (0.256)
Age -0.126 -0.240 -0.275
(0.274) (0.239) (0.217)




Black ball (d) 5.563** 3.073*
(2.631) (1.670)
Others’ black balls -1.854** -1.024*
(0.877) (0.557)




Message dummies No No Yes No No
Constant 44.91*** 26.83*** 57.40*** 52.47*** 51.16***
(6.974) (9.121) (6.879) (4.714) (4.349)
Observations 384 384 384 384 384
R2 0.0838 0.161 0.203 0.0552 0.198
Table E.1: Determinants of employer evaluations of candidates in the baseline condition; in the IV regressions
posterior is instrumented by black ball ; standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the subject’s group of 4
contestants and 4 employers; ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
average confidence.
Results in column 4 indicate that a contestant gets a higher evaluation if her competitors
are less confident. Moreover, the variables score and others’ scores indicate that relative ability
matters: a higher own score and lower scores by one’s competitors both lead to higher eval-
uations. In column 5, we add a contestant’s own message and the sum of messages sent by
her competitors to the set of regressors. Again, results suggest that the non-verbal benefits of
confidence are robust to the inclusion of variables pertaining to a contestant’s competitors.
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